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among state and local government-operated pension systems in the United States.  It 
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Public Pension Governance and Asset Allocation 
 
As the American ‘Baby Boomer’ generation has drawn closer to retirement, 
the issue of retirement benefits and pensions has increased dramatically in importance 
in American political discourse.  As early as the late 1990s, over a decade before the 
first of the Baby Boomers would reach the age of sixty-five, potential Social Security 
disasters started to become apparent.  However, while Social Security is the largest 
source of retirement income among Americans, the majority of the retirement income 
of a typical American comes from one or more of three sources: Social Security, 
pension benefits, and private savings.  To date, the issue of the solvency of the Social 
Security system is at the forefront of the public debate, public pensions at the state 
and local level are often overlooked in the public discussion of retirement incomes.  
This is an unfortunate oversight, as public pension funds hold considerable liabilities 
owing to a large number of Americans and many of these public systems find 
themselves in unenviable financial situations.  Moreover, many of the individuals who 
are members of public pension systems are not eligible for Social Security benefits, 
implying that the general health of these public pension systems are of great import to 
their post-retirement plans.  
State and local pension funds held assets that exceeded 2.7 trillion dollars at 
the end of the second quarter of 2006 (of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
Board, 2006). There are approximately 20.5 million individuals covered in these 
programs: 5.3 million retirees/beneficiaries, 12.8 million current employees, and 2.4 
million inactive members (Olivia S. Mitchell et al., 2001).  The absolute size of these 
funds in terms of assets and members implies that even small improvements in the 
administration and investment performance of these programs could result in 
significant gains in retirement income for millions of individuals in the United States.     2
Because the majority of public pension plans are defined benefit (DB) plans, it 
is possible for pension liabilities to exceed pension assets.  Before the bear market in 
2001, the aggregated funding ratio (the ratio of assets to liabilities) across the major 
public pension systems was nearly 106%.  However, as of year-end 2002, the 
combined funding ratio of state and local pension plans had dropped to approximately 
91%, implying approximately $200 billion in unfunded liabilities.  These aggregate 
numbers mask the wide variation among systems.  Wilshire Associates compiled a 
dataset including 123 public pension systems (accounting for about 80% of the market 
value of public retirement funds), and found that the combined pension systems of 
only nine states had funding ratios above 100%.  In contrast, the median state funding 
ratio was 83%, with fifteen states below 80% (Stephen L. Nesbitt, 2003), and there 
may be reason to believe these figures are optimistic.
1  Should investment returns not 
be sufficient to pay for future pension liabilities, the shortfalls will likely become a 
liability to future taxpayers.   
Most of the previous papers analyzing the investment behaviour of public 
pension funds in the United States (William G. Albrecht and Vineeta Lokhande 
Hingorani, 2004, Michael Useem and David Hess, 2001, Michael Useem and Olivia 
S. Mitchell, 2000) have looked at the relationship between governance structure and 
measures of overall pension fund performance, typically real rates of return.  Useem 
and Mitchell and Useem and Hess looked primarily for a direct link between asset 
                                                 
1 The eight states with funding ratios above 100% were Wisconsin (126%), North Carolina (116%), 
Georgia (111%), Arizona (109%), Florida (104%), New York (102%), California (102%), 
Pennsylvania (102%), and South Dakota (101%).  The fifteen states with funding ratios below 80% 
were Maryland (78%), Oregon (76%), Massachusetts (76%), Kansas (76%), Montana (75%), New 
Hampshire (74%), Connecticut (73%), Nevada (72%), Maine (72%), Rhode Island (70%), Mississippi 
(70%), Indiana (67%), Louisiana (65%), Oklahoma (56%), Illinios (54%), and West Virginia (45%).  
Some caution should be taken, however, in interpreting these results, as the date of the actuarial 
valuation used varies among states.  The most recent actuarial valuations of those states with higher 
funding ratios tend to be before the bear market.   
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allocation and returns and found that measures of system governance have limited 
explanatory power and are generally insignificant in models that control for asset 
allocation.  Perhaps not surprisingly, they find that asset allocation is the primary 
determinant of fund performance.  Albrecht and Hingorani expanded upon these 
models, looking not only at the direct effect of governance on rates of return, but also 
at the indirect effect, through asset allocation.  This paper builds on the work by 
Albrecht and Hingorani in a number of important ways.  First, we narrow our focus to 
look exclusively at the link between governance, particularly board composition, and 
asset allocation.  This allows us to examine the effect of this element of governance 
on a much larger set of asset allocation variables than have been examined in previous 
papers.  Additionally, the paper improves on prior empirical work in this area, which 
has typically used cross-sectional data, by using an expanded panel dataset that 
includes data for 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000.   
Pension Governance and Data 
All of the pension plan and pension system data come from the biennial 
survey administered by the Public Pension Coordinating Council (PPCC) (Paul Zorn, 
1996, 1998, 2000, 2002).  The PPCC is sponsored by the National Association of 
State Retirement Administrators, the National Conference on Public Employee 
Retirement Systems, and the National Council on Teacher Retirement.  Each of these 
groups is interested in improving government sponsored pension programs in the 
United States, and the data from the survey are collected and synthesized into a report 
that outlines broad trends in public pensions and gives general summary statistics. 
Between 1995 and 2001, the survey was administered in the odd-years, asking for 
data about the prior year.  For example, the 1995 survey reports data from 1994, and 
was published in 1996.  Unfortunately, the survey underwent some revisions between   4
each of the four collection years.  Between 1995 and 1997, the survey was only 
slightly modified, and all of the variables used in this study appear in both years.  
Between 1997 and 1999, the survey was shortened slightly, however for the 2001 
survey the survey was changed substantially and many questions were omitted.  Two 
of the governance variables we will examine were included in the 1995, 1997, and 
1999 surveys but were dropped in 2001.  The availability of each variable will be 
discussed below.    
Despite undergoing constant revision, the survey remained consistent in its 
overall structure.  The survey was broken into three sections: system, defined benefit 
(DB) plan, and defined contribution (DC) plan.  A pension system is an organization 
charged with the responsibility of administering one or more pension plans.  A 
pension plan is the actual program by which employees are provided either annuities 
or a lump sum payment upon retirement on the basis of any contributions made during 
their working years.  Many systems administered more than one plan during this time 
period, and a few systems administered both DB and DC plans at the same time.  For 
example, while PERS of Mississippi administered only one DB plan, the Minnesota 
State Retirement System administered six DB plans, and the State Universities 
Retirement System of Illinois administered two plans, one DB and one DC.
  We 
follow the custom within this literature to only consider systems that exclusively 
administer DB plans in our estimations, despite the fact that DC trustees are still able 
to exert considerable control over the assets held by the pension system.
2   
                                                 
2 Participants in DC systems are not typically given free reign over the investment of their 
individual balances, but rather are given a menu of investment styles over which to choose, and trustees 
are able to determine what assets constitute the items on the menu.  
   5
 The system level survey includes most of the questions on governance and 
investment performance.  The plan level surveys take a more detailed look at each 
individual plan, including membership, funding ratios, and benefit formulas.   
Table 1 examines in detail the distribution of asset allocation among ten asset 
classes.  Each variable measures the percentage of total assets held in that asset class.  
Five broad asset classes are considered: total equities, total bonds, cash and short 
term, alternate investments, and real estate equity.  In addition, equities are further 
broken out into two sub-classes, domestic equity and international equity.  Finally, 
fixed income investment is broken out into three sub-classes: domestic bonds, 
international bonds, and domestic government bonds.  Except for domestic 
government bonds, data for each of these variables were collected in all four survey 
years.  Data on domestic government bonds were collected only in the first three 
survey years.   
[Table 1] 
Thirteen independent variables are selected from the PPCC data.  Of these 
thirteen variables, five are related to board composition, five are measures of formal 
external controls, and three are control variables.  The governance variables 
pertaining to board composition are active, retired, exofficio, appointed, and 
boardsize.  The first two examine the relationship between board membership and 
system membership.  The percentage of the governing board that are active members 
of the retirement system is measured by active, and retired measures the percentage 
who are retired members of the retirement system.  The percentage of the governing 
board that are non-members is omitted to prevent collinearity with the intercept term.  
The variables exofficio and appointed measure the percentage of the board that are ex 
officio members and appointed members, respectively.  The percentage of the board   6
that is elected by system members is again omitted to prevent collinearity with the 
intercept term.  The final board composition measure, boardsize, is the natural log of 
the total number of board members.  All of these variables were collected in 1995, 
1997, and 1999, while only exofficio, appointed, and boardsize were collected in 
2001.    
The other five governance variables measure the extent to which the board is 
subject to external controls.  All of these variables are indicator variables and were 
included in each of the four surveys.  The existence of state constitutional provisions 
that regulate the pension statement is given by constitution.  For example, until 1996, 
the West Virginia constitution outlawed all equity investments, and many state 
constitutions place caps on the percentage of system assets that can be held in equity 
investments.  Whether or not the system is forced to submit to an independent 
performance audit is measured by evaluation, and prudent indicates whether there is a 
prudent person investment restriction in place.  Some states have passed laws 
delineating written ethics standards and policy guidelines, which are recorded as 
policy.  Finally, some states have established lists of securities in which systems are 
either forced, or strongly incentivized, to invest; the existence of state legal lists is 
coded as list. 
  The final three variables are used to control for underlying plan characteristics 
that may have an influence on board investment behavior.  Two variables are selected 
to control for underlying demographic factors that might influence the portfolio 
selected: the average income of currently active system members is coded as income, 
and the percentage of total system members who are retired is coded as pctretired. It 
is also possible that larger pension systems may have an advantage in being able to   7
diversify more extensively than smaller systems, we control for this with the variable 
assets, which measures total system assets in billions of dollars.   
Conventional wisdom states that the first two variables in the set of 
governance variables, active system members as a percentage of the governing board 
and retired system members as a percentage of the governing board, should reveal 
systems moving their investments out of risky assets and into relatively safe assets.  
We hypothesize, however, that that the exact opposite will occur within public 
pension systems; boards that are dominated by active system members should tend to 
move out of equity and into relatively safe domestic bonds, while in contrast, boards 
that are dominated by retired members on the board of trustees should seek to increase 
investment in riskier asset classes (for example, venture capital and international 
equity).   
Typically, members of defined benefit plans receive an annuity upon 
retirement, the annual value of which is usually determined by a complicated formula 
that varies among systems and incorporates the employee’s final average salary and 
years of service.  This annuity either terminates or, if the employee has a surviving 
spouse, is diminished upon death.  One effect this may have is that any investment or 
risk preferences based on a bequest motive will either be reduced or eliminated, 
effectively shortening the time horizon of plan members.  While this is true of all 
members, the time horizons of older and retired members will likely be shortened 
more than those of younger, active members. 
On its own, a shorter time horizon (or a larger discount rate) would not 
necessarily prompt retired members to prefer riskier portfolios than active members.  
In fact, experimental results have shown that higher degrees of risk aversion are 
correlated with shorter time horizons (Vital Anderhub et al., 2001), implying that if   8
anything, retired members should prefer safer portfolios than active members.  
However, this will not be the case if the elected political actors (or their agents) who 
have influence over either benefits or contribution rates have short time horizons as 
well.  A simple framework is offered to explore this hypothesis.   
In the private sector, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA) mandates that all private pension systems be fully funded at all times.  As 
noted above, this is not true of the public sector, where many pension systems have 
funding ratios well below 100%.  However, in the long run, pension assets must equal 
pension liabilities for public retirement systems as well.  Any shortfall in investment 
return must be met by an increase in contribution rates, a reduction in benefit, or an 
increase in general taxation.  A windfall in investment return must be met by a wage 
hike, increase in benefits, or a decrease in general taxation.  If political leaders are 
myopic, they will have a strong incentive to postpone their reaction to investment 
shortfalls, as wage cuts, tax increase, and benefits reductions are politically 
unpopular.  As an example of this phenomenon, Eaton and Nofsinger (2004) have 
found that poorly performing public pension systems tend to manipulate their 
actuarial assumptions to make their retirement programs appear to be more fiscally 
sound than they actually are.  Thus, rather than make the politically unpopular move 
of increasing taxes or reducing benefits, or look irresponsible for not fixing an ailing 
pension system, politicians would prefer to use “creative accounting” to make the 
pension system appear to be more solvent than it actually is.  Their discovery of this 
tactic provides some evidence that politicians wish to delay the tax increases and/or 
benefits reductions necessitated by under-performing pension systems.  On the other 
hand, myopic politicians will have a strong incentive to rush to react to investment 
windfalls, and tax reductions, wage hikes, and/or benefits increases to take advantage   9
of overfunding are policies that are likely to be pursued in the short run due to their 
political popularity.   
These incentives imply that retired system members will receive most of the 
benefit from a high rate of return while bearing disproportionately little risk.  One can 
draw an analogy between this argument and a standard public finance argument of 
loss offsets; if the government taxes profits without loss offsets, entrepreneurs will 
invest in fewer risky projects than they otherwise would.  If the entrepreneur loses 
money, she bears the full cost, but if the entrepreneur earns a profit, she only receives 
part of the benefit.  In the context of investment income for retired system members, 
losses are subsidized through intergenerational transfers, but benefits are fully 
realized by retired members, leading to retired members wanting to invest in more 
risky assets than they otherwise would. 
  Board size is expected to be a strong determinant of asset allocation choice as 
well.  We predict that larger boards will tend to hold riskier portfolios, eschewing 
bonds in general, particularly domestic bonds, in favor of international investments.  
This result would be consistent with a wide variety of different literatures across the 
social sciences that associate group size with risks taken and/or performance in risky 
activities.   
The theoretical framework for this phenomenon is provided by the literature in 
experimental psychology on group polarization and the “risky shift.”  In the 1960s 
and 1970s, psychologists began to take notice of a fairly persistent phenomenon: 
decisions made by groups tend to be significantly more risk preferring than the 
average risk position of the individuals within the group (see for example (Lawrence 
K. Hong, 1978).  This phenomenon was termed the risky shift, and was a particular 
example of the general phenomenon known as group polarization.   Group   10
polarization describes a situation in which an initial attitudinal predisposition, 
however small or large, by the individual members of the group is somehow 
exacerbated following group discussion.  Within the context of the risky shift, for 
example, a group of individuals who have varying risk preferences will, upon being 
placed in a situation where the group can observe their risk-related decisions (or must 
make a group decision), endorse a position that is near the risk preference of the 
individual who prefers the most risk.
3  This mechanism implies that board risk 
preference will be increasing in board size, but at a decreasing rate: the likelihood of 
the marginal board member with a random risk preference to prefer a position riskier 
than any other board member is higher in a small board than in a large board.  With 
this mechanism in mind, we use the natural log of the size of the board of investors to 
capture this effect.    
While the present paper does not attempt to examine actual pension 
performance relative to the market, recent research in the experimental economics and 
finance literatures would imply that larger boards may in fact perform worse than 
smaller boards.  In their working paper, Hayne and Cox (1997) examine performance 
in a winner’s curse experiment among both individuals and groups, finding that 
groups perform less rationally than individuals; within the context of a common value 
auction, this implies that groups take on substantially more risk than individuals.  
Moreover, Yermack’s (1996) analysis of the relationship between board size and 
market valuation in large U.S. corporations shows that board size is negatively 
                                                 
3 It is of note that some experiments in this literature found the opposite conclusion—a “cautious shift” 
could result.  Despite their seemingly contradictory nature, psychologists think of both the risky shift as 
examples of group polarization.  Which one will occur is thought to be culturally dependent.  For 
example, Hong (1978) argues that while American culture tends to exalt risk-taking behavior, 
Confucian cultural beliefs are such that cautiousness is applauded.  Experimentally, he finds that 
individually, Taiwan Chinese and Americans are significantly different, with statistically significant 
risky-shifting by Americans and cautious-shifting by Taiwan Chinese.  The data in this paper point to 
the risky shift as being the relevant type of group polarization present.     11
correlated with Tobin’s Q.  Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) survey the literature on 
boards of directors and state that the negative relationship between board size and the 
financial performance of firms is an “empirical regularity.”   
The final two variables looking at board composition are the percentage of the 
board that is either ex officio or appointed.  These two variables are included to test 
whether or not board members who held their position by virtue of some political 
process have an impact on asset allocation.  If trustees are pressed to make decisions 
with their political implications in mind, the greater the likelihood that investment and 
other decisions will not be wealth maximizing.  Appointees are anticipated to be more 
likely to make decisions in this manner, as they simply hold their position by the 
grace of some elected official, whereas ex officio members are on the committee on 
their own virtue and face electoral constraints that restrains their ability to make non-
wealth maximizing decisions.  Typically, these decisions come in the form of 
economically targeted investments. 
Economically targeted investments, or ETIs, are investments that are made 
based upon criteria other than the standard risk-return criterion.  For example, in the 
early 1980s many public pension funds made large sacrifices to returns in the name of 
increased home-ownership by subsidizing high-risk home mortgages for low-income 
borrowers (Alicia H. Munnell, 1983).  The primary argument for ETIs comes from 
Watson (1994), who argues that, if capital markets are inefficient, there must be some 
worthy projects that do not get funded.  If these worthy projects can be identified, and 
furthermore determined to have some measurable corollary benefit to the plan 
participants (e.g., increased incomes or employment opportunities for plan members), 
then they are good candidates for targeted investing.   Despite the adverse selection 
problem that obviously arises, making it very difficult for investors to select the   12
worthy project from the lemons (John R. Nofsinger, 1998),
4 ETIs are often used as 
justification for the de facto funneling of the assets of public pension funds into the 
state coffers to finance social investments, shore up budget deficits, encourage home-
ownership by low-income households, or even engage in public works projects.  
Previous empirical research has shown that ETIs tend to reduce risk-weighted returns 
(Olivia S. Mitchell and Ping-Lung Hsin, 1997, Alicia H. Munnell, 1983, John R. 
Nofsinger, 1998).   
It is unlikely that the approach taken in this paper would be able to identify 
any significant ETI activity.  While we attempt to explain variation among broad asset 
classes, it is likely that ETIs are accomplished by targeting specific assets within an 
asset class rather than by favoring one asset class over another.  For example, rather 
than simply purchasing more government bonds, a system could target its investments 
by underdiversifying within this asset class, purchasing disproportionately many local 
and state bonds from their jurisdictional sponsors.   
It should be noted that the hypotheses laid out for each of the five board 
composition variables are fundamentally related to the riskiness of the overall 
portfolio held by the pension systems.  While we anticipate that they will hold a 
greater proportion of their portfolio in riskier asset classes, doing so does not 
necessarily imply that their portfolio is in fact riskier, in fact it could imply less risk; 
if the correlation between the relatively riskier asset classes and the relatively safer 
asset classes is less than one, holding the riskier assets will reduce the overall risk 
                                                 
4 Nofsinger (1998) argues that, even with inefficient capital markets, it is unlikely that fund managers 
can identify these opportunities because of the lemons problem.  It is not evident whether a potential 
investment project is one that should have gone unfunded or not, and given that capital markets are 
considered to be very efficient, there will only be a few “good” projects that receive too little 
investment.  This implies that fund managers attempting to make economically targeted investments 
must choose from a set that includes a large number of bad projects and a small number of good 
projects. 
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associated with the portfolio.  We will empirically address the issue of risk directly in 
the next section. 
The five political restriction variables can be broadly interpreted as examining 
the impact of the regulatory framework within which the systems operate.  Each of 
the five variables look at various types of regulations that are ostensibly designed to 
provide protections to plan participants (and by extension, taxpayers), preventing 
trustees from acting imprudently in carrying out their fiduciary duties.      
Legal lists originated in England in the eighteenth century as a list of assets for 
which, if they earned poor or negative returns, a trustee could not be held liable.  
These lists typically only included government bonds.  Not surprisingly, cautious 
trustees generally concentrated their investments in these relatively safe assets.  In the 
early eighteenth century the legal list evolved into the prudent person rule, a new 
standard that freed trustees to select any portfolio that, ex ante, would be selected by a 
prudent investor (Rachlinksi 2000).  Often these investment restrictions are enacted at 
the constitutional level; historically state constitutions have limited equity investments 
through means ranging from the complete prohibition of all equity investments to 
equity caps to banning certain types of assets.  Many systems subject the investment 
decisions made by the board to external performance evaluators.  Finally, some 
systems have adopted written ethics standards or policy guidelines that create a degree 
of transparency in investment decisions—should the board not live up to these 
standards or guidelines, members and beneficiaries are given recourse.  Although 
these regulations are justifiable in terms of helping resolve the principal-agent 
problem that exists between trustees and plan members, they could potentially provide 
a means through which policy makers external to the board of trustees can influence 
investment decisions.     14
While the preceding discussion of board composition and ETIs examines the 
incentives of board members, political decision makers outside the board of trustees 
are often capable of influencing investment decisions through external political 
restrictions and regulations that constrain board members.  State legal lists could be 
used to resolve the principal-agent dilemma, but it is also plausible that they could be 
a means by which states coerce the plans they sponsor to invest only in state approved 
assets.  Systems subject to such legal lists are expected to exhibit a strong tendency to 
invest much less in international equity and hold more domestic (particularly 
government) bonds.  The closely related prudent person restriction, on the other hand, 
is expected to have a negligible effect on investment decisions.   
Constitutional investment restrictions have become increasingly uncommon in 
recent years.  Whereas many state constitutions have historically contained clauses 
restricting the amount of equity investment systems are able to pursue, these caps 
have increased or disappeared since the early 1990s.  We suspect that these 
restrictions are generally no longer binding, however if we had data stretching back 
into the late 1980s, this variable may have some explanatory power.  Using a similar 
specification but restricting their analysis to only data from 1992, Useem and Mitchell 
(2000) find just that: the relationship between equity investment and constitutional 
investment restrictions and found that the effect was negative and significant at the 
1% level.  
  Finally, both independent performance evaluations and the existence of 
written ethics standards or policy guidelines are expected to have wide ranging effects 
on investments if there is agency problem stemming from asymmetric information 
between the trustees and plan participants, causing moral hazard.  One hypothesis as 
to why this might occur is that the existence of independent evaluations and   15
guidelines help limit the liability of trustees.  If trustees are risk averse, then they will 
be more likely to pursue risky investments when they feel protected from downside 
risk.  Hence, an independent evaluation or standard is part of an optimal contract, as 
trustees will only pursue riskier strategies if they know the participants verify that bad 
years are a result of bad luck, not an imprudent investment decision.  However, it 
could also be the case that evaluations and standards are binding constraints on any 
opportunistic actions of the trustees and serve as a monitoring device.   
The variables described above are used to examine the relationship between 
governance factors and asset allocation.  The models are estimated with a two-sided-
Tobit specification as the dependent variables, the proportion of system assets 
allocated to specific asset classes, are naturally bounded by 0 and 100.  Each model is 
estimated with system-level random effects and yearly fixed effects.  Yearly fixed 
effects are included in each model because there is a clear trend of systems 
reallocating system assets from fixed income to equity investments over this time 
period.  There are a number of reasons why this trend may emerge.  For example, 
systems may have been attempting to take advantage of the bull market during the late 
1990s, or they may not have been active in rebalancing their portfolios during this 
time. Including the yearly fixed effects allows the estimation of the effect of 
governance on asset allocation independent of these potential temporal trends.  
System-level random effects are chosen in favour of fixed effects because many of the 
governance variables are relatively time invariant within each system.
5 
                                                 
5 The robustness of these specifications are checked by estimating the models with pooled OLS and 
FGLS as well.  The pooled OLS specification includes yearly fixed effects and system level clustering 
of standard errors; the FGLS estimation includes yearly fixed effects and system-level random effects.  
Hausman tests confirm the choice of random effects over fixed effects.  The results are not reported but 
are generally consistent across specifications.   16
As stated above, the scope of the survey was reduced in the last two surveys, 
and data on active/retired board members was not collected in 2001, nor was data on 
government bond holdings.  As a result, we report two sets of models.  Our primary 
regressions use data from all four survey years, and a second set including data from 
just the 1995, 1997, and 1999 surveys to look at the effect of active and retired board 
members as well as the effect of all the governance variables on government bonds.   
While the PPCC took great care to attempt to get high quality data, there are 
nevertheless some holes in the data. Some systems did not complete the survey in all 
four collection years, and others did not fully complete every question in the 
questionnaires.  Unfortunately, we have little option but to drop the observations for 
which our variables of interest are missing and estimate the system with an 
unbalanced panel.  This yields between 570 and 573 observations, including data from 
246 systems, for the primary regressions and between 450 and 453 observations, 
including data from 237 systems, for the estimations that omit the 2001 survey data.   
The general form of the regressions is: 
Eq. 1                     ,       ,                ,    
 In Equation 1, the dependent variables are each of the specific asset allocation class 
variables discussed in the previous section and  1,2,...,10 i = for the ten different asset 
classes.  The measures of pension governance and the control variables are contained 
in the matrix Xi,t.  The term i μ  is a pension system specific error term. The year fixed 
effect is vt and the error term is , it ε .  The results from these regressions are reported in 
tables 2 through 5.  The empirical results generally support most of the hypotheses 
laid out above.   




While board composition with respect to appointees/ex officio membership has 
little effect (as predicted), we find that, relative to boards dominated by active system 
members, boards that are dominated by retired members on the board of trustees seek 
to increase investment in alternative investments and international equity.  In addition, 
board size seems to be strongly correlated with both higher holdings of equities 
(domestic and international), alternate investments, and international bonds and lower 
holdings of domestic bonds.  Both of these phenomena may in turn be indicative of 
the taking on of riskier portfolios, which will be examined in the next section.   
  The effects of both the constitutional and prudent person restrictions are found 
to be relatively insignificant.  However, list restrictions have a strong effect in 
increasing bond holdings at the expense of equity holdings.  The effect in the case of 
government bonds is very strong.  Written investment policies have a weak effect on 
asset allocation, with their presence hinting at a likely increase in equity holdings, but 
independent performance evaluations have a very large effect on investment 
decisions.  Systems subject to independent performance evaluations have a strong 
tendency to have much larger equity holdings, both in domestic and international 
equity, smaller bond holdings, and a greater portion of their bonds held in 
international bonds as opposed to domestic bonds.   
Governance and Risk 
  Much of the foregoing analysis has argued that the effects of pension system 
governance on investment strategies may be indicative of governance having a   18
systematic effect on the riskiness of pension asset holdings.  It is not necessarily the 
case, however, that systems with greater investments in relatively risky asset classes 
also bear more risk.  While international securities on their own may be riskier than 
domestic ones, diversification of one’s portfolio through the purchase of international 
securities would have the effect of reducing risk, not increasing it, so a more detailed 
analysis is necessary.  In this section, we seek to address the question of risk directly.   
  The hypotheses as to how the board composition variables might affect risk 
were laid out above.  Retired system members are anticipated to want riskier 
portfolios than active members, as the politicized nature of these pension systems 
could lead to intergenerational risk transfers.  Larger boards are expected to hold 
riskier portfolios than smaller boards due to the psychological phenomenon of group 
polarization.  Finally, if ETI activity is present, one predicts appointed membership to 
be associated with higher levels of risk relative to ex officio membership and elected 
membership.     
  While we have made a plausible case for why board composition might have 
an effect on portfolio risk, we do not feel that such a case can be made for the 
different types of investment restrictions.  Prudent person laws, investment policy 
statements, and independent performance evaluations are designed for the purpose of 
reducing agency problems.  However, the existence of agency problems would lead to 
these restrictions having an effect on risk-adjusted returns, not risk per se.  And while 
constitutional and investment list restrictions may limit the classes of assets invested 
in, they do not put constraints on the riskiness of the portfolio chosen.  Again, any 
effect these policies might have would be on risk-adjusted returns. 
  As acknowledged above, the potential to use risky asset classes to diversify 
one’s portfolio makes their usage as indicators of portfolio risk problematic.  To   19
address this, we will estimate the portfolio risk of each system using two methods, 
CAPM (Sharpe 1964) and asset class factor modeling, or style analysis (Sharpe 1988, 
1992). 
Financial models that estimate risk are typically estimated using at least four 
years of monthly data.  Unfortunately, the PPCC survey did not collect monthly data, 
and is limited to yearly data between 1990 and 2000.  We appreciate the difficulty of 
estimating financial models using only eleven observations, however, because these 
measures are being estimated for use as dependent variables, any errors-in-variables 
problems associated with their imprecision will simply inflate the standard errors of 
the second stage regressions.  Thus, while the models explaining risk will be 
estimated with high error, so long as the measures of risk are estimated without bias, 
the estimated coefficients of the second stage regressions will be unbiased as well.     
  The CAPM model states that there is a linear relationship between risk and 
return and can be written as: 
Eq. 2                                  
In this model, the rate of return on portfolio i is given by Ri, Rf is the risk free rate of 
return, and Rm is the market rate of return.  The estimated beta measures portfolio risk, 
alpha measures the extent to which the portfolio outperformed (or underperformed) 
the market, and the error term is often associated with luck.  We estimate betas for 
each of the pension systems reporting 11 years of rate of return data using ordinary 
least squares, with the Wilshire 5000 as the market rate of return and the 30-day 
Treasury Bill rate as the risk free rate of return.   
  A style analysis model (Sharpe 1988, 1992) generally takes the form of: 
Eq. 3                                        20
where Ri denotes the return on asset i and Fj denotes the value of the jth factor.  In this 
specification, each factor is the rate of return on a specific asset class.  This method of 
analysis differs from a simple factor model in that it adds the following constraints: 
Eq. 4        ,   1
 
   
 
 
Eq. 5    0    ,   1        
  Because of data limitations, we restrict the number of factors to only two asset 
classes, the Wilshire 5000 and the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond index.  This 
does, however, have the added benefit of simplifying the estimation process.  To 
estimate a constrained regression of this type with inequality constraints, Sharpe 
(1987) and Markowitz (1987) have shown that one must estimate the model using 
quadratic programming.  However, in the case that one estimates the model with only 
two factors, the estimation process can be simplified.  If a regression model using 
only Equation 4 yields both estimated coefficients between 0 and 1, then Equation 5 is 
non-binding so the estimates from a regression using just the first constraint should be 
the same as a regression using both.  If a model using only Equation 4 yields 
estimates that violate Equation 5, say  1 0 β <  and  2 1 β > , then the best fit for a 
regression satisfying both Equation 4 and Equation 5 should be  1 0 β = and  2 1 β = .  
The estimated coefficients on the Wilshire 5000 rate of return are coded as the 
variable Estimated Style and are our second measure of portfolio risk. 
  We compute both risk estimates for each of the 67 systems in the PPCC 
dataset that reported rates of return for each year between 1990 and 2000.  We use the 
same data governance data and controls as the previous section, however because the 
risk estimates do not vary within each system, we create a dataset of means by 
averaging the governance data over the available collection years.  Finally, because   21
some of the systems did not respond to all of the governance questions, we drop those 
systems from the data and are left with 58 observations for our analysis.   
  We estimate the effect of board composition on risk by running regressions of 
the form                   where Xi includes both the board composition variables 
and the same three control variables from before.  Because the OLS estimates display 
heteroskedasticity, we account for this by estimating the equations using both 
weighted least squares and multiplicative heteroskedastic models.  These results are 
reported in Table 6. 
[Table 6] 
  Overall the results are reasonably strong, especially when one considers that 
the dependent variables are likely to have been measured with error.  For the most 
part, the results are in line with the hypotheses above.  While the retired coefficient is 
only significant at the 10% level in one of the estimations, this only signifies that 
retired members do not tend to behave differently from non-system members on the 
board.  The relevant comparison is between retired and active board members, and the 
last row in the table shows the result of an F-test of the equality of the two 
coefficients.  In all four specifications the retired coefficient is considerably higher 
than the active coefficient, and this difference is significant at the 10% level in three 
of the four specifications.  The results also provide evidence that board size is 
positively correlated with portfolio risk.  The results are statistically significant at the 
10% level in one of the specifications and at the 5% level in two others.   
  The most puzzling result is the effect of ex officio membership on risk.  We 
expected ex officio members to have less incentive to engage in ETIs than appointed 
members, which would lead to less risky portfolios, which is consistent with the 
estimates.  An F-test (not reported) of the equality of the exofficio and appointed   22
variables is rejected at the 5% level in each regression.  However, we would not have 
predicted that ex officio members would desire less risky portfolios than board 
members elected by system participants.   
Conclusion 
  This paper makes four contributions to the literature on the governance of 
public pension systems.  First, it qualifies prior assertions in the literature that asset 
allocation is the primary determinant of investment returns.  We believe that 
governance has at least an indirect effect on investment performance by affecting 
these asset allocation decisions.  Second, we have provided some evidence that 
pension board composition, in addition to influencing asset allocation, also may have 
an effect on portfolio risk as well.  Third, this paper highlights many potentially 
fruitful avenues for further research by postulating multiple hypotheses to explain 
why governance has the effect it does.  Finally, the results have a number of public 
policy implications that system participants and government sponsors alike can 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics of Asset Allocation Variables 
 
Variable Mean  Variance  Min 25
th 
Pctile  Median  75
th 
Pctile  Max 
Total Equity  48.31  481.296 0 42 56 63.2  99 
Total Bonds  38.16  403.636 0 28.1 36.2 45.39  100 
Alternate 
Investments  1.13 11.779 0 0 0 0  50.8 
Cash & Short 
Term  4.23 79.720 0 0.1 2 5  100 
Real Estate 
Equity  1.89 9.453 0 0 0 3.3  17.1 
Domestic 
Equity  39.60 331.106 0 34.6 44.5 50.7 75.7 
International 
Equity  6.82 49.455 0 0 5.5 12 49 
Domestic 
Bonds  36.18 408.769 0 25.1 34 44 100 
**Domestic 
Govt Bonds  14.06 403.618 0 0 0 25 100 
International 
Bonds  2.07 20.882 0 0 0 3 61 
 
This table contains summary statistics of the asset allocation variables used in this 
study.  For all of the asset classes other than domestic government bonds, this 
includes data from 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000.  Unfortunately, the PPCC survey did 
not ask respondents for the percentage of their portfolios invested in domestic 
government bonds in 2000, so the data reported for this variable only includes data 
from 1994, 1996, and 1998.     26
Table 2 
 







Investments Cash  Real Estate 
Equity 
                 
appointed  -3.684  -0.076 0.088 -0.653  -1.088 
-1.115  -0.025 0.044 -0.545  -0.728 
exofficio  -0.757 1.824  -2.640 -2.605 0.796 
-0.166 0.459  -0.937 -1.512 0.368 
boardsize 7.795*** -7.599***  2.790*  0.938  1.612 
3.242 -3.368  1.882  1.081 1.484 
constitution -1.611  -0.199  -0.159  1.113  -1.342 
-0.828 -0.120  -0.113  1.553 -1.606 
evaluation 9.494***  -3.986**  0.972  -0.212  0.119 
4.534  -2.337 0.634 -0.274  0.120 
list -5.979***  4.758***  -1.565 0.552  -2.027** 
-3.214  3.041 -1.204 0.793  -2.466 
policy 8.489* 2.489  -5.246**  -0.789 2.606 
1.927 0.666 -2.305 -0.487 1.193 
prudent  4.518*  -0.220 -1.485 -0.235  -0.217 
1.897 -0.110 -0.880 -0.261  -0.204 
income 0.018  -0.029** 0.005  0.009  0.006 
1.027 -2.061  0.443  1.300 0.953 
pctretired 3.133  0.340  -3.878  -3.703**  1.191 
0.774 0.104 -1.270 -2.202 0.605 
assets 0.104  -0.120**  0.082**  -0.002 0.040 
1.587  -2.111 2.394 -0.075  1.499 
Intercept 14.194*  61.468***  -5.818  5.385**  -6.644* 
1.906 9.314 -1.303 1.967  -1.827 
N  573  573 573 573  570 
note:  0.01 - ***; 0.05 - **; 0.1 - *; z-statistics reported 
This  table uses data from 1994-2000 and shows the results from random effects Tobit 
estimation 
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Table 3 
 










              
appointed -1.424  -3.445*  1.041  -2.445 
-0.479 -1.787 0.337 -1.231 
exofficio 0.516 -2.861 0.771 0.334 
0.127 -1.079 0.186 0.116 
boardsize 4.302** 5.168***  -10.461***  3.172** 
1.995 3.647 -4.551 2.229 
constitution  -1.002 -0.046 -0.171 -1.036 
-0.577 -0.039 -0.099 -0.764 
evaluation 5.969***  5.679*** -6.033*** 4.761*** 
3.250 4.110 -3.357 2.846 
list -1.760  -4.775***  4.817***  -1.602 
-1.062 -4.223 2.941 -1.259 
policy 7.826*  -1.786  2.751  0.118 
1.943 -0.677 0.706 0.036 
prudent 2.279  2.352  -1.813  3.365* 
1.074 1.625 -0.866 1.930 
income 0.003  0.003  -0.022  -0.011 
0.176 0.301 -1.481  -0.845 
pctretired  4.529 -0.498 0.462 0.458 
1.272 -0.197 0.133 0.137 
assets 0.012  0.072**  -0.062  0.020 
0.211 1.973 -1.041 0.506 
Intercept 17.725***  -11.258**  66.525***  -13.664*** 
2.614 -2.532 9.806 -2.690 
N  570 570 573 573 
note:  0.01 - ***; 0.05 - **; 0.1 - *; z-statistics reported 
This  table uses data from 1994-2000 and shows the results from random 
effects Tobit estimation   28
Table 4 
 







Investments Cash  Real Estate 
Equity 
                 
active 0.115 3.504 0.845 -0.947  1.760 
0.029 0.972  0.373 -0.658 1.012 
retired  3.951 -1.671 9.168** -1.677 4.942 
0.533  -0.257 2.413 -0.623  1.610 
appointed  -3.202  -1.897 2.070 -0.719  -0.866 
-0.848  -0.544 1.052 -0.532  -0.547 
exofficio -2.380  0.492  1.858  -3.446*  0.254 
-0.438 0.097  0.618  -1.732 0.110 
boardsize 8.998*** -9.991***  2.270*  0.957  1.478 
3.551 -4.087  1.690  1.044 1.358 
constitution -2.309  0.702  -0.041  1.420*  -0.863 
-1.070  0.384 -0.033 1.857  -0.971 
evaluation 12.782***  -4.322**  0.036  -0.399  0.885 
5.242  -2.154 0.025 -0.464  0.780 
list -6.542***  5.000***  -1.224 0.644  -1.536 
-2.958  2.597 -0.947 0.806  -1.616 
policy 12.319** 0.530 -6.561*** -1.019  2.637 
2.484 0.122 -2.984 -0.581 1.235 
prudent 4.779* -0.156  -0.398  0.287  0.450 
1.718 -0.066 -0.241  0.286 0.376 
income 4.898 -0.154 -5.604*  -4.903***  1.867 
0.996 -0.040 -1.742 -2.580 0.870 
pctretired 0.042  -0.036  -0.001  0.013  0.013 
1.359 -1.618 -0.035  1.066 1.211 
assets 0.091 -0.076 0.067* -0.013  0.066** 
1.193  -1.130 1.942 -0.480  2.295 
Intercept 3.629  68.041***  -4.940  6.372**  -9.413** 
0.417 8.591 -1.046 2.027  -2.370 
N  453  453 453 453  450 
note:  0.01 - ***; 0.05 - **; 0.1 - *; z-statistics reported 
This  table uses data from 1994-1998 and shows the results from random effects Tobit 
estimation   29
Table 5 
 












                 
active  -0.095 0.927 5.861 -2.875 -6.034 
-0.026 0.412 1.564 -1.096 -0.750 
retired -6.447  14.377***  -4.251  3.916  3.964 
-0.967 3.532 -0.629 0.797  0.264 
appointed -1.257  -3.178  -0.803 -3.476  -12.984* 
-0.364 -1.506 -0.223 -1.451  -1.764 
exofficio -1.646 -3.052 0.220 1.676 -12.098 
-0.329 -0.995 0.042  0.491  -1.109 
boardsize 5.572** 4.718***  -12.377***  3.450**  -8.492 
2.388 3.337 -4.936 2.230  -1.587 
constitution  -2.489 0.140 1.005 -1.274  3.392 
-1.276 0.114 0.525 -0.859  0.797 
evaluation 7.137***  7.703*** -5.735***  4.461**  -1.681 
3.272 4.662 -2.711 2.381  -0.376 
list -1.543  -6.178***  4.720**  -1.543  14.181*** 
-0.767 -4.797 2.359 -1.051  3.359 
policy 12.437***  -0.736  0.498  0.133  -12.386 
2.673 -0.252 0.110 0.038  -1.277 
prudent 2.381  1.736  -1.501  3.926**  6.254 
0.953 1.074 -0.611 1.977  1.263 
income  6.272 -1.959 -0.833 2.514  6.870 
1.471 -0.678 -0.206 0.646  0.782 
pctretired 0.004  0.026  -0.021 -0.025  0.027 
0.158 1.124 -0.862  -0.938 0.546 
assets  0.008 0.063 -0.026 0.013  -0.187 
0.109 1.582 -0.375 0.276  -1.072 
Intercept 10.139  -14.392***  70.489***  -13.364**  37.841** 
1.248 -2.764 8.616 -2.273  2.186 
N  450 450 453 453  453 
note:  0.01 - ***; 0.05 - **; 0.1 - *; z-statistics reported 
This  table uses data from 1994-1998 and shows the results from random effects Tobit 
estimation 
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Table 6 
 










              
active  -0.029 -0.016 -0.050 -0.064 
-0.39 -0.20 -0.83 -1.13 
retired  0.267* 0.273 0.175 0.162 
1.68 1.58 1.25 1.20 
appointed  0.048 0.034 0.023 -0.007 
0.71 0.47 0.44 -0.12 
exofficio -0.201**  -0.213*  -0.221***  -0.277*** 
-2.33 -1.88 -3.19 -3.88 
boardsize 0.083*  0.076  0.083**  0.080** 
1.79 1.44 2.15 1.96 
assets  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
1.00 1.38 0.91 1.51 
pctretired -0.310  -0.323  -0.356*  -0.505** 
-1.37 -1.41 -1.82 -2.48 
income  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001** 
-0.84 -1.19 -1.08 -2.04 
Intercept 0.328**  0.262*  0.378***  0.372*** 
2.46 1.79 3.32 3.27 
active=retired 3.25*  2.45  2.73*  3.32* 
Prob > F  0.08 0.12  .10  .07 
N  58 58 58 58 
note:  0.01 - ***; 0.05 - **; 0.1 - *; 
This table uses data averaged over the four collection years.  The first and 
second columns are estimated using WLS and report t-statistics.  
Columns three and four are maximum likelihood estimates of multiplicative 
heteroscedastic regression and report z-statistics.  The active=retired row 
shows the results of F-Tests for the equality of the coefficients on active 
and retired. 
 